

1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

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4 August Term, 2003

5 (Argued: October 30, 2003

Decided: March 17, 2004)

6 Docket No. 03-7416
7

8 SAJIDA BANO, HASEENA BI, SUNIL KUMAR, DR. STANLEY NORTON,
9 ASAD KHAN, SHIV NARAYAN MAITHIL, DEVENDRA KUMAR YADAV,
10 BHOPAL GAS PEEDIT MAHILA UDYOG SANGATHAN (BGPMUS), GAS
11 PEEDIT NIRASHRIT PENSION BHOGI SANGHARSH MORCHA
12 (GPNPBSM), BHOPAL GAS PEEDIT MAHILA STATIONERY
13 KARMACHARI SANGH (BGPMSKS), BHOPAL GAS PEEDIT SANGHARSH
14 SAHAYOG SAMITI (BGPSSS), and BHOPAL GROUP FOR INFORMATION
15 AND ACTION (BGIA), on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,

16 Plaintiffs,

17 HASEENA BI, BHOPAL GAS PEEDIT MAHILA UDYOG SANGATHAN
18 (BGPMUS), BHOPAL GAS PEEDIT MAHILA STATIONERY KARMACHARI
19 SANGH (BGPMSKS), BHOPAL GAS PEEDIT SANGHARSH SAHAYOG
20 SAMITI (BGPSSS), and BHOPAL GROUP FOR INFORMATION AND
21 ACTION (BGIA), on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,

22 Plaintiffs-Appellants,

23 - v. -

24 UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION and WARREN ANDERSON,

25 Defendants-Appellees.
26

27 Before: FEINBERG, KEARSE, and RAGGI, Circuit Judges.

28 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District
29 of New York, John F. Keenan, Judge, dismissing amended complaint seeking monetary and injunctive
30 relief for personal injuries and property damage allegedly caused by pollutants released from plant site
31 in Bhopal, India.

32 Affirmed in part, and vacated and remanded in part.

33 CURTIS V. TRINKO, New York, New York (Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,
34 New York, New York, H. Rajan Sharma, Edison, New Jersey, Richard
35 L. Herz, Earthrights International, Washington, D.C., on the brief), for

1 Plaintiffs-Appellants.

2 WILLIAM A. KROHLEY, New York, New York (William C. Heck,
3 Kelley Drye & Warren, New York, New York, on the brief), for
4 Defendants-Appellees.

5 Members of the United States House of Representatives Frank Pallone,
6 Jr., Raul M. Grijalva, Sherrod Brown, Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, Janice
7 D. Schakowsky, Dennis J. Kucinich, Sheila Jackson-Lee, Joseph
8 Crowley, and Fortney Pete Stark, Washington, D.C., filed a brief as
9 Amici Curiae in support of Appellants.

10 KEARSE, Circuit Judge:

11 Plaintiffs Haseena Bi and several organizations representing residents of Bhopal, India,
12 to wit, Bhopal Gas Peedit Mahila Udyog Sangathan ("BGPMUS"), Bhopal Gas Peedit Mahila
13 Stationery Karmachari Sangh ("BGPMSKS"), Bhopal Gas Peedit Sangharsh Sahayog Samiti
14 ("BGPSSS"), and Bhopal Group for Information and Action ("BGIA") (collectively the "Bhopal
15 organizations"), appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District
16 of New York, John F. Keenan, Judge, dismissing their amended complaint seeking monetary and
17 equitable relief for personal injuries and property damage allegedly suffered by Bi and persons
18 similarly situated as a result of exposure to water contaminated by chemicals released from a factory
19 site operated in Bhopal in 1969-1984 by a subsidiary of defendant Union Carbide Corp. ("Union
20 Carbide"). The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant
21 to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6) and/or 56, ruling (1) that Bi's damages claims for personal injury
22 and property damage are barred by the statutes of limitations set forth in New York Civil Practice Law
23 and Rules ("N.Y.C.P.L.R." or "CPLR") §§ 214 and 214-c (McKinney 2003), (2) that the Bhopal
24 organizations lack standing to bring claims for money damages on behalf of their members, and (3)
25 that the injunctive relief demanded in the amended complaint is not feasible. On appeal, plaintiffs
26 contend (a) that the district court's statute-of-limitations ruling was erroneous because Bi's personal
27 injury claims are timely under, inter alia, a continuing trespass theory or a continuing nuisance theory,
28 and because defendants failed to carry their burden of showing when Bi's property damage claims

1 accrued; (b) that the court's ruling on standing was erroneous because the Bhopal organizations should
2 be allowed to pursue damages claims as putative class representatives; and (c) that the court's
3 conclusion as to the impracticability of the requested equitable relief was unsubstantiated. For the
4 reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the district court except to the extent that it dismissed
5 Bi's claims for monetary and injunctive relief for alleged injury to her property. As to those claims,
6 we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings, including consideration of whether those
7 claims may be pursued in a class action.

8 I. BACKGROUND

9 In 1984, a highly toxic gas, methyl isocyanate, was released into the air from a
10 chemical manufacturing facility in Bhopal operated by Union Carbide India Limited ("UCIL"), an
11 Indian company that was 50.9%-owned by Union Carbide, killing thousands of people and injuring
12 more than 200,000 others (the "gas-release disaster"). See generally In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas
13 Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195, 197 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 871 (1987). The present lawsuit
14 is one of many commenced after that disaster. See Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 273 F.3d 120, 122-
15 24 (2d Cir. 2001) ("Bano I"). In Bano I, we affirmed the dismissal of so much of the present
16 complaint as asserted claims for injuries arising out of the gas-release disaster, ruling that those claims
17 were barred by a settlement between Union Carbide and the government of India that had been
18 approved by the Supreme Court of India. See id. at 122; see also Bi v. Union Carbide Chemicals &
19 Plastics Co., 984 F.2d 582, 586 (2d Cir.) (affirming ruling that individual victims lack standing to
20 challenge the settlement negotiated between Union Carbide and India), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 862
21 (1993). We noted in Bano I, however, that the district court had dismissed without discussion the
22 common-law claims for environmental injuries unrelated to the gas-release disaster, and we remanded
23 for further proceedings on those claims. See 273 F.3d at 132-33.

1 A. UCIL's Plant Operations and Storage of Toxic Wastes

2 The portion of the amended complaint whose dismissal was vacated in Bano I alleged
3 principally that residents of and near Bhopal suffered physical injury and property damage caused by
4 pollution that emanated from the site of UCIL's operations in Bhopal and entered the residents' water
5 supply. For purposes of the present appeal from the district court's grant of summary judgment and
6 its decision that the Bhopal organizations lacked standing as a matter of law, we view the record in
7 the light most favorable to plaintiffs as the parties against whom summary judgment was granted.

8 UCIL's Bhopal plant commenced operation in 1969 on two noncontiguous tracts of
9 land, totaling 88 acres, leased at various times from the Indian State of Madhya Pradesh. At the plant,
10 pesticides imported from a Union Carbide facility in West Virginia were converted into a marketable
11 product for sale in India. In 1979 or 1980, UCIL began to manufacture at its Bhopal plant the
12 pesticides that it previously had been importing. As a byproduct of the expanded operations,
13 hazardous wastes were produced. UCIL kept these wastes in tanks and pits at the plant site, as well
14 as in three solar evaporation ponds constructed on the noncontiguous leased property some 800 meters
15 north of the plant.

16 A UCIL document indicates that in March 1982, UCIL was aware of leakage from one
17 of the evaporation ponds and that another pond showed signs of leakage. In April 1982, a UCIL
18 document noted that "continued leakage from [an] evaporation pond [was] causing great concern" and
19 that repairs were being planned with the assistance of consultants. Immediately following the 1984
20 gas-release disaster, operations at the UCIL plant were discontinued, and the plant was closed in early
21 1985. Thereafter, the Indian government took control of the unit responsible for the production of
22 methyl isocyanate. Apparently it is undisputed that the plant never resumed normal operations and
23 that no effluent was added to the solar evaporation ponds after 1984.

24 In 1989, the Madhya Pradesh government asked the National Environmental
25 Engineering Research Institute ("NEERI"), an Indian governmental organization, to conduct a study
26 of the environmental damage caused by the solar evaporation ponds in order to help determine

1 whether the land where those ponds were located was suitable for alternative industrial uses. In April
2 1990, NEERI issued a report stating that its study found no evidence of certain chemicals that would
3 be indicative of pollution in test wells dug within a one-kilometer radius of the solar evaporation
4 ponds and found that the water quality met local standards in test wells dug within a 10-kilometer
5 radius of the ponds. (See NEERI, Assessment of Pollution Damage Due to Solar Evaporation Ponds
6 at UCIL, Bhopal (1990) ("First NEERI Report" or "First Report") at xiv-xv.) Its

7 [i]nvestigations revealed that the land and water environment have not been
8 contaminated due to the provision of flexible membrane liner in the pond and
9 [the] presence of low permeable plastic clay below [the solar evaporation
10 ponds].

11 (Id. at unnumbered Foreword page.) "The overall conclusion of the study [wa]s that no contamination
12 of soils and ground water was observed due to the impoundment of wastewater in solar evaporation
13 ponds." (Id. at xvii.) However, the First NEERI Report recommended remediation of the waste sites,
14 to wit, excavation of the sediment, residue, and contaminated soil from two of the solar evaporation
15 ponds and their containment in a secure landfill in the third pond. (See id. at xviii.) UCIL thereafter
16 undertook these tasks, but work to close and cap the secure landfill was not completed until July 1998.

17 In the meantime, there were additional environmental studies and a change in UCIL's
18 corporate ownership. In September 1994, Union Carbide sold all of its shares in UCIL, which was
19 subsequently renamed "Eveready Industries India Limited" ("EIL"). EIL succeeded to UCIL's lease,
20 which required EIL to use the land for industrial purposes. EIL retained NEERI to assess
21 environmental conditions on the plant premises in 1994.

22 In October 1997, NEERI responded with a report entitled Assessment of Contaminated
23 Areas Due to Past Waste Disposal Practices at EIL, Bhopal (1997) ("Second NEERI Report"). The
24 Second NEERI Report stated that NEERI had found contamination within the former UCIL plant site
25 at the waste disposal areas. (See id. at unnumbered pages 5-7 of Executive Summary.) However, it
26 reaffirmed the First Report's finding of no groundwater contamination in and around the plant site.
27 (See id. at unnumbered page 5 of Executive Summary.) A July 1998 press release by the government
28 of Madhya Pradesh reported that the Madhya Pradesh Pollution Control Board had also collected and

1 analyzed samples from drinking water sources in the areas around the former UCIL premises. (See
2 Government of Madhya Pradesh, Directorate of Public Relations, Safe Disposal of Wastes in Union
3 Carbide Premises: No Contamination of Ground Water or Soil from Wastes (July 28, 1998) at 1.)
4 That study "found no traces of chemicals in the water sources that may be linked to the chemicals used
5 in the Union Carbide factory or the wastes there." (Id.)

6 EIL made efforts to remediate the plant sites and was to develop a proposal for
7 industrial activity on the property. When it failed to come up with such a proposal, it was eventually
8 required to surrender the land. The State of Madhya Pradesh took control of the land in September
9 1998.

10 In November 1999, Greenpeace Research Laboratories, Department of Biological
11 Sciences, University of Exeter ("Greenpeace" or "Greenpeace Research Laboratories"), issued a report
12 based on its independent testing of soil and water in Bhopal. (See I. Labunska et al., Greenpeace
13 Research Laboratories, The Bhopal Legacy: Toxic Contaminants at the Former Union Carbide
14 Factory Site, Bhopal, India: 15 Years After the Bhopal Accident (1999) ("Greenpeace Report").) That
15 report recounted findings of "substantial and, in some locations, severe contamination of land and
16 drinking water supplies with heavy metals and persistent organic contaminants both within and
17 surrounding the former UCIL pesticide formulation plant." (Greenpeace Report at 4.)

18 B. Bi's Pollution Claims and the Motion To Dismiss

19 The Bhopal organizations and several other entities who are not parties to this appeal
20 commenced the present action in November 1999; an amended complaint, adding Bi as a plaintiff, was
21 filed in January 2000. The amended complaint added claims alleging, to the extent pertinent to this
22 appeal, that the individual plaintiffs and other similarly situated residents of and near Bhopal suffered
23 physical injury and property damage caused by pollution emanating from the UCIL property and
24 entering the residents' water supply (collectively the "pollution claims"). The amended complaint
25 alleged that the Greenpeace Report "confirm[s] scientifically that massive environmental

1 contamination, including contamination of the drinking water of residents in the nearby communities,
2 entirely unrelated to the Bhopal Disaster, has taken place at the UCIL site where large amounts of
3 toxic chemicals and by-products from the factory's original manufacturing processes continue to
4 pollute the land and water." (Amended Complaint ¶ 95.)

5 According to an affidavit submitted by Bi, Bi has, since 1990, resided in Atal Ayub
6 Nagar, India, a residential community "in the immediate vicinity of the [former] UCIL plant site."
7 (Affidavit of Haseena Bi dated September 26, 2002 ("Bi Aff."), ¶ 4.) "Within a few weeks" of moving
8 to Atal Ayub Nagar, Bi and her family began to experience health problems, which included skin
9 rashes, severe nausea, and headaches, and which, over time, worsened into severe abdominal pain and
10 bleeding rashes. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 6.) Bi's family members ultimately attributed their health problems to
11 "water taken from the handpump water well near where [Bi] live[s]" (id. ¶ 6), which they used for
12 drinking, cooking, bathing, and cleaning. According to Bi, "[a]ll of the handpump wells in the nearby
13 residential areas . . . seem to be contaminated because the water has the same strong noxious smell
14 of chemicals with an oily layer on top, and others using those wells have complained to [Bi] of similar
15 symptoms." (Id. ¶ 8.) Because she has no access to an alternative water supply, Bi continues to be
16 exposed to the contaminated water. (See id. ¶¶ 7, 9; Amended Complaint ¶ 8.)

17 The Bhopal organizations were described in the amended complaint principally as
18 grass-roots, self-help, or advocacy organizations whose members were victims, or survivors of
19 victims, of the gas-release disaster. (See Amended Complaint ¶¶ 28, 30-32.) The amended complaint
20 alleged that the "vast majority of members" of BGPMUS and BGPMSKS continue to reside in
21 residential colonies surrounding the former UCIL plant site and "continue to be exposed to pesticides,
22 toxic chemicals and other by-products which have contaminated the soil and water near the facility."
23 (Id. ¶¶ 28, 30.) The plaintiff organizations asserted claims for money damages on behalf of their
24 members for personal injury and property damage based on theories of negligence and strict liability
25 (see id. ¶¶ 180-85, 194-200), as well as public nuisance, private nuisance, and trespass (see id. ¶¶ 186-
26 93, 206-09). The amended complaint also sought relief in the form of remediation of the former UCIL

1 plant site, of community wells, and of plaintiffs' own properties (see id. ¶ 213), and "recov[ery of] the
2 costs of a medical monitoring program" for residents exposed to the chemicals (id. ¶ 205).

3 Defendants Union Carbide and Warren Anderson, its former chief executive officer
4 (collectively "Carbide"), moved to dismiss the pollution claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1),
5 12(b)(6) and/or 56. They contended, inter alia, that Bi's damages claims for personal injury and
6 property damage arising out of her alleged exposure to contaminated water were barred by the three-
7 year statute of limitations governing "latent" injuries, N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214-c(2). As to the plaintiff
8 organizations, Carbide moved to dismiss for lack of standing, arguing that they could not meet the
9 prerequisite that "neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested require[] the participation of
10 individual members in the lawsuit," Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432
11 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).

12 With respect to plaintiffs' claims for equitable relief, defendants argued that an order
13 requiring Union Carbide to remediate the former UCIL site would be infeasible and inappropriate
14 given that possession of the site had been returned to its owner, the State of Madhya Pradesh. Carbide
15 contended that any order that the site be remediated would thus entail insurmountable problems of
16 judicial supervision and would interfere with India's national interest in its environmental regulation.
17 Carbide also argued that a program of medical monitoring for the estimated tens of thousands of
18 individuals who resided in Bhopal at any time in the more than 30 years since the UCIL plant
19 commenced operations would be extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, for a court in the United
20 States to administer, especially since the amended complaint failed to identify any particular diseases
21 or injuries believed to be caused by the chemicals.

22 In opposition to the motion to dismiss, Bi contended that she alleged "patent" rather
23 than "latent" harms and that her claims should thus be analyzed under CPLR § 214 rather than CPLR
24 § 214-c. She argued that under CPLR § 214 her action was not barred because the ground-water
25 contamination constituted a continuing nuisance and continuing trespass, causing repeated harms that
26 gave rise to successive causes of action and entitled her to seek damages for harms to her person and

1 property incurred within the three years immediately prior to the filing of the amended complaint,
2 despite the fact that the tortious conduct had begun at an earlier time. Bi also contended that,
3 irrespective of whether her claims would otherwise be barred by CPLR § 214 and CPLR § 214-c,
4 principles of equitable tolling and equitable estoppel should preserve her claims because Union
5 Carbide had affirmatively misrepresented to the public that chemicals from the UCIL plant caused no
6 contamination of the surrounding area.

7 The Bhopal organizations opposed Carbide's motion to dismiss their claims for lack
8 of standing, arguing that Hunt and its progeny were distinguishable because they involved associations
9 seeking to bring damages claims on behalf of their members in a non-class-action context, whereas
10 the Bhopal organizations sought to pursue their members' monetary claims as putative class
11 representatives. They argued that in these circumstances, the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23,
12 rather than the Hunt test, should govern whether an association is a suitable plaintiff.

13 Finally, plaintiffs challenged Carbide's contention that the equitable relief requested
14 in the amended complaint would present the district court with insurmountable difficulties. They
15 argued that there would be no interference with local governance because (a) the Madhya Pradesh
16 authorities had already sought a continuation of on-site rehabilitation efforts from UCIL's successor,
17 (b) the State of Madhya Pradesh wants Union Carbide to rehabilitate the site, and (c) an injunction
18 could incorporate the environmental standards of India. As to the requested medical monitoring
19 program, the Bhopal organizations argued that the program would encompass only persons currently
20 residing in Bhopal and currently exposed to chemicals from the former UCIL plant, a population that
21 could be defined as individuals currently living in 10 neighborhoods affected by groundwater
22 contamination, and that the program could screen for cancers and immune deficiencies caused by
23 exposure to the groundwater contaminants identified in the Greenpeace Report.

24 C. The Dismissal of the Pollution Claims: Bano II

25 Following limited discovery by Bi and the Bhopal organizations, the district court

1 granted defendants' motion to dismiss in its entirety. See Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 99 Civ.
2 11329 (JFK), 2003 WL 1344884 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2003) ("Bano II"). At the outset of its
3 discussion, the court noted that, whereas the original complaint had alleged that plaintiffs' claims arose
4 under the laws of India, their amended complaint abandoned reliance on Indian law and asserted
5 instead that plaintiffs had no remedy under those laws (see Amended Complaint ¶ 139). The court
6 concluded that plaintiffs' environmental claims should be addressed under New York law. See
7 Bano II, 2003 WL 1344884, at *3 ("New York law applies in cases in which the harm occurs abroad,
8 and where there is no conflict with the law of the foreign jurisdiction."). Further, as federal
9 jurisdiction of the action was premised on diversity of citizenship, the district court ruled that the
10 timeliness of plaintiffs' claims was governed by the New York statutes of limitations. See id. at *4.

11 As to the statute-of-limitations prong of defendants' motion, the district court ruled that
12 Bi's personal injuries were properly classified as "latent" rather than "patent" in light of the assertions
13 in her affidavit, because, although "the period between exposure and manifestation was not of great
14 duration, the injuries did not manifest themselves immediately," id. at *4-5. Accordingly, the district
15 court concluded that CPLR § 214-c(2) applied and that the limitations period began when an injury
16 first manifested itself. See id. at *5. Bi's injuries having first manifested themselves in 1990, the court
17 found that the three-year limitations period provided by CPLR § 214-c expired before Bi filed her
18 personal injury claims in 2000. See id.

19 The court also found that Bi's personal injury claims were not made timely by CPLR
20 § 214-c(4), which contains an exception to § 214-c's three-year limitations period where "technical,
21 scientific or medical knowledge and information sufficient to ascertain the cause of his injury had not
22 been discovered, identified or determined prior to the expiration of the period within which the action
23 or claim would have been authorized," N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214-c(4). In such circumstances, "where the
24 discovery of the cause of the injury is alleged to have occurred less than five years after discovery of
25 the injury . . . an action may be commenced or a claim filed within one year of such discovery of the
26 cause of the injury." Id. Assuming arguendo the applicability of CPLR § 214-c(4), the district court

1 concluded that Bi's personal injury claims would be time-barred because that section, allowing suit
2 to be brought at most six years after the discovery of her injury, would have required that her claims,
3 first asserted in 2000, be asserted not later than 1996. See Bano II, 2003 WL 1344884, at *5.

4 The court rejected Bi's claims of property damage for most of the same reasons, stating
5 that

6 Bi's personal injury and property claims both stem from groundwater
7 contamination. It is nonsensical to assert that Bi's personal injuries which
8 manifested themselves in 1990 and to which she attributes the cause to be the
9 well water should be viewed separately from her property damage claims.

10 Id. at *6.

11 Finally, the district court found that even if the harms alleged by Bi were deemed
12 "patent," so that CPLR § 214 rather than CPLR § 214-c would control, her claims would still be time-
13 barred. The court rejected Bi's contention that her claims for personal injuries were timely under
14 continuing nuisance or continuing trespass doctrines, concluding that such doctrines could preserve
15 claims only of property damage, not of personal injury. See id. at *6. And the court concluded that
16 the continuing tort doctrines did not make Bi's property damage claims timely because those doctrines
17 apply only to property damage claims seeking injunctive relief, not monetary relief. See id.

18 The district court rejected Bi's claim of fraudulent concealment, concluding that Union
19 Carbide's alleged "concealment does not rise to the requisite level of misrepresentation." Id. at *7.
20 It also ruled that tolling the statute of limitations based on equitable estoppel would be inappropriate
21 because Bi possessed, within the limitations period, sufficient factual information to give her a duty
22 to investigate the cause of her injuries. See id.

23 As to the Bhopal organizations, the district court found that they lacked standing to
24 press claims for money damages because a determination of the residents' damages would require
25 individualized proof and the individual participation of each of the organizations' members. See id.
26 at *8. The court implicitly rejected the organizations' contention that the standing requirements
27 articulated in Hunt should be relaxed where an organization seeks to maintain the suit as a class
28 action.

1 A. The Applicability of CPLR § 214-c to Bi's Claims

2 As to timeliness, plaintiffs argue principally that CPLR § 214-c, which governs claims
3 for injuries whose effects are latent, is inapplicable because (a) an interval of merely a few weeks
4 between one's exposure to a harmful substance and the manifestation of one's injury is not sufficient
5 to classify the effects as latent, (b) there was no evidence that there was any interval between Bi's
6 exposure to such substances and the manifestation of her injuries, (c) defendants failed to show when
7 Bi first learned of the damage to her property, and (d) the accrual date provided in § 214-c does not
8 apply to claims for injunctive relief. We conclude that Bi's claims for damages and injunctive relief
9 for property damage may be timely.

10 Section 214 of the CPLR, which generally governs claims for personal injury or injury
11 to property, states, to the extent pertinent here, that, except as provided in § 214-c, an action to recover
12 damages for injury to property must be brought within three years of the date of injury, see
13 N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214(4), and that, except as provided in § 214-c or in other sections not pertinent here,
14 an action to recover for personal injury must be brought within three years of the date of injury, see
15 N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214(5). Section 214-c modifies § 214 with respect to a claimed injury that was not
16 discoverable immediately upon its occurrence. It provides that for a "personal injury or injury to
17 property caused by the latent effects of exposure to any substance or combination of substances," the
18 three-year period within which a suit "to recover damages" must be brought "shall be computed from
19 the date of discovery of the injury by the plaintiff or from the date when through the exercise of
20 reasonable diligence such injury should have been discovered by the plaintiff, whichever is earlier."
21 N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214-c(2) (emphasis added).

22 For purposes of CPLR § 214-c, a claim for a latent personal injury accrues "when the
23 injured party discovers the primary condition on which the claim is based." Matter of New York
24 County DES Litigation, 89 N.Y.2d 506, 509, 655 N.Y.S.2d 862, 863 (1997). The fact that there may
25 be a delay before "the connection between th[e] symptoms and the injured's exposure to a toxic
26 substance is recognized" does not delay the start of the limitations period. Id. Nor does the worsening

1 of a plaintiff's symptoms over time alter or postpone the accrual date. See, e.g., Whitney v. Quaker
2 Chemical Corp., 90 N.Y.2d 845, 847, 660 N.Y.S.2d 862, 863 (1997) (mem.). "All that is necessary
3 to start the limitations period [of 214-c(2)] is that plaintiff be aware of the primary condition for which
4 damages are sought." Id.; see, e.g., Tarazi v. Exxon Corp., 269 A.D.2d 385, 386, 703 N.Y.S.2d 205,
5 206 (2d Dep't) (mem.), lv. denied, 95 N.Y.2d 755, 711 N.Y.S.2d 833 (2000).

6 Similarly, a damages claim for latent injury to property resulting from the seepage or
7 infiltration of a toxic foreign substance over time is governed by the § 214-c limitations period. See,
8 e.g., Jensen v. General Electric Co., 82 N.Y.2d 77, 81, 603 N.Y.S.2d 420, 421 (1993); see generally
9 Germantown Central School District v. Clark, Clark, Millis & Gilson, AIA, 100 N.Y.2d 202, 206-07,
10 761 N.Y.S.2d 141, 143-44 (2003). Such a claim accrues when the plaintiff first discovers the property
11 damage; the fact that the defendant's conduct may be characterized as a continuing trespass or
12 nuisance does not delay the commencement of the limitations period. See, e.g., Jensen v. General
13 Electric Co., 82 N.Y.2d at 88, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 425 (there is "no continuing-wrong exception" to
14 § 214-c). Although subsection (4) of § 214-c provides a limited exception to the § 214-c(2) rule that
15 the limitations period begins on the date of first discovery of the injury, see N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214-c(4)
16 (claim may be asserted within one year after discovery of the injury's cause, provided that, inter alia,
17 the discovery-of-cause date is within five years after the discovery-of-injury date), that provision is
18 of no assistance to a plaintiff whose claims were first asserted more than six years after she was aware
19 of her alleged injuries.

20 Section 214-c(2), however, applies only to a claim for "damages." N.Y.C.P.L.R.
21 § 214-c(2). Thus, the timeliness of a claim for injunctive relief is not governed by that section, see,
22 e.g., Jensen v. General Electric Co., 82 N.Y.2d at 89-90, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 426, and an injunctive
23 remedy may be available to halt a continuing nuisance or trespass even when the recovery of money
24 damages is barred by the statute of limitations, see id. at 90, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 426. Although "causes
25 of action for damages at law are placed in repose under CPLR § 214-c(2) after three years from
26 discovery," the availability of "appropriate injunction relief is preserved in the traditional equity form."

1 Id.

2 The statute of limitations is normally an affirmative defense, see N.Y.C.P.L.R.
3 § 3018(b), on which the defendant has the burden of proof, see generally id. Practice Commentaries,
4 C3018:13, at 149 (McKinney 1974); but see Pompa v. Burroughs Wellcome Co., 259 A.D.2d 18, 22,
5 696 N.Y.S.2d 587, 590 (3d Dep't 1999) (a plaintiff who relies on a statutory exception to the statute
6 of limitations, such as CPLR § 214-c(4), has the burden of showing that the exception applies). The
7 defendant's normal burden includes showing when the cause of action accrued. "Where it does not
8 conclusively appear that a plaintiff had knowledge of facts from which the injury could reasonably be
9 inferred, the complaint should not be dismissed on motion and the question should be left to the trier
10 of fact." Glod v. Morrill Press Division of Engraph, Inc., 168 A.D.2d 954, 956, 564 N.Y.S.2d 905,
11 908 (4th Dep't 1990); see also Roman v. Radio Frequency Co., 207 A.D.2d 1012, 1012, 616 N.Y.S.2d
12 824, 824 (4th Dep't 1994) (mem.).

13 With these principles in mind, we turn to the various claims asserted by Bi in the
14 present action.

15 1. Bi's Claims of Personal Injury

16 Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in ruling that an injury that manifests
17 itself just weeks after one's exposure to a toxic substance can be considered "latent," arguing
18 principally that CPLR § 214-c applies only to injuries that do not manifest themselves for many years.
19 It may be that the New York State Legislature's primary concern in enacting CPLR § 214-c was for
20 persons whose injuries manifested themselves after the three-year limitations period provided by
21 CPLR § 214(5) had expired, see generally Jensen v. General Electric Co., 82 N.Y.2d at 83-84, 603
22 N.Y.S.2d at 422-23. But as enacted, CPLR § 214-c speaks simply in terms of whether the effects of
23 an exposure are "latent," without specifying the length of time that must pass before those effects can
24 be considered latent; and at least one New York appellate court has held that effects were latent within
25 the meaning of § 214-c when the interval between exposure and first manifestation of injury was just

1 a few weeks, see Crossman v. Harding Industrial Tool, 222 A.D.2d 1081, 635 N.Y.S.2d 397 (4th Dep't
2 1995) (mem.).

3 In Crossman, the plaintiff, a lathe operator, noticed a rash on his hands in January 1987,
4 "within a few weeks after" his employer started using a certain substance as a machine coolant. Id.
5 at 1081, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 398. On the advice of the company doctor, the plaintiff temporarily ceased
6 working on machines using the coolant; but after he resumed that work, additional skin eruptions and
7 irritations appeared on his hands in March 1987. When the dermatitis continued to worsen, the
8 company doctor on April 14, 1987, referred the plaintiff to a dermatologist. On April 30, 1987, the
9 dermatologist informed the plaintiff that he suffered from chronic dermatitis as the result of direct
10 hand contact with the coolant. See id., 635 N.Y.S.2d at 398-99. The plaintiff's action for damages
11 for personal injuries caused by exposure to the coolant was commenced on April 17, 1990. The trial-
12 level court dismissed the case on the ground that the action was preempted by a federal statute. See
13 id., 635 N.Y.S.2d at 398. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal, but it ruled that the
14 complaint should have been dismissed instead on the ground that the action was barred by CPLR
15 § 214-c's three-year statute of limitations for "latent" injuries, since "[t]he record conclusively
16 establishe[d] that plaintiff discovered before April 17, 1987 that he had sustained an injury." 222
17 A.D.2d at 1082, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 399.

18 The Crossman plaintiff's injury was thus found to be "latent" within the meaning of
19 CPLR § 214-c when it manifested itself "within a few weeks after" his exposure to the coolant, 222
20 A.D.2d at 1081, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 398. Accordingly, in the present case, we see no error in the district
21 court's ruling that the effects of Bi's alleged exposure to harmful substances emanating from the plant
22 site are to be considered latent, notwithstanding that the interval between her exposure and the injuries'
23 initial manifestation was not years but, in Bi's words, "a few weeks."

24 Plaintiffs argue alternatively that the record does not indicate that there was any interval
25 whatever between Bi's exposure to contamination from the former UCIL plant and the manifestation
26 of her injuries. This contention is contradicted by the amended complaint and Bi's own affidavit.

1 Plaintiffs alleged that waters in areas adjacent to the plant were contaminated by the mishandling of
2 hazardous materials "[d]uring the entire period that the Bhopal plant was in operation" (Amended
3 Complaint ¶ 98), a period that predated Bi's move to "the immediate vicinity of the UCIL plant site"
4 (Bi Aff. ¶ 4). Bi stated in her affidavit that her injuries began to manifest themselves "a few weeks"
5 after that move; that "at least some of" her "symptoms appeared to be generally associated with
6 drinking, cleaning, cooking or bathing with water taken from the handpump water well near where"
7 she lived; that there was "simply no alternative source of potable water in the particular residential
8 area of Bhopal where [her] family live[d]"; and that "[a]ll of the handpump wells in the nearby
9 residential areas also seem to be contaminated" (*Id.*, ¶¶ 5-8.) These statements by Bi as to the
10 absence of any sources of water other than those that the amended complaint alleged were already
11 contaminated can only mean that Bi was exposed to the contaminants upon her move. And given her
12 statement that her injuries first manifested themselves within "a few weeks" after that move, plaintiffs'
13 own assertions show an interval between Bi's exposure and the initial manifestation of her injuries.

14 We conclude that the district court properly ruled that CPLR § 214-c was applicable
15 to Bi's personal injury claims and that, as her injuries manifested themselves in 1990 and she did not
16 bring suit until 2000, those claims were therefore barred by § 214-c's three-year statute of limitations.

17 2. Bi's Claims of Property Damage

18 We reach a different conclusion as to the dismissal of Bi's claims of property damage,
19 for, although CPLR § 214-c governs those claims as well, a plaintiff's discovery of one injury does
20 not necessarily mean that she discovered a separate and distinct injury simultaneously. See, e.g., State
21 v. Fermenta ASC Corp., 238 A.D.2d 400, 402, 656 N.Y.S.2d 342, 345 (2d Dep't) (mem.), lv. denied,
22 90 N.Y.2d 810, 664 N.Y.S.2d 271 (1997); Bimbo v. Chromalloy American Corp., 226 A.D.2d 812,
23 815, 640 N.Y.S.2d 623, 625-26 (3d Dep't 1996). The question of whether two claimed injuries are
24 separate and distinct or whether, instead, one was an "outgrowth, maturation or complication" of a
25 previously discovered--and now time-barred--injury is a question of fact. State v. Fermenta ASC

1 Corp., 238 A.D.2d at 402, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 345 (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Bimbo
2 v. Chromalloy American Corp., 226 A.D.2d at 815, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 625. The question of when a
3 plaintiff actually discovered a given injury is also a question of fact. See, e.g., Glod v. Morrill Press
4 Division of Engraph, Inc., 168 A.D.2d at 956, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 908. The question of the time by
5 which the plaintiff had constructive knowledge of the injury, i.e., the time by which she "could with
6 reasonable diligence have discovered" the injury, CPLR § 214-c(2), is ordinarily "a mixed question
7 of law and fact," Glod v. Morrill Press Division of Engraph, Inc., 168 A.D.2d at 955, 564 N.Y.S.2d
8 at 908. The existence of material factual disputes concerning such questions precludes summary
9 dismissal of the action.

10 In Bimbo v. Chromalloy American Corp., for example, the plaintiffs, who knew in
11 1978 that their well water was contaminated, brought suit for contamination of the shallow
12 groundwater on their property after they were warned of the latter contamination in 1992. The
13 defendants moved to dismiss on statute-of-limitations grounds. The trial court denied the motion
14 because of conflicting evidence as to the relationship between the contamination of the shallow
15 groundwater and the contamination of the well water. See 226 A.D.2d at 812-15, 640 N.Y.S.2d at
16 624-25. The Appellate Division affirmed, stating that because the defendants had not definitively
17 shown that the plaintiffs' claimed damage to shallow groundwater "was an outgrowth, maturation or
18 complication" of a known but different injury, id. at 815, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 625 (internal quotation
19 marks omitted), summary dismissal of the groundwater damage claim would have been "premature,"
20 id.

21 In the present case, the district court dismissed Bi's claims of property damage on the
22 ground that the manifestation of her personal injuries in 1990, which she attributed to contaminated
23 well water, gave her constructive knowledge, as a matter of law, of the damage to her property. We
24 disagree. Although the amended complaint alleged that defendants had discharged chemicals,
25 pesticides, and other pollutants onto property owned by Bi and the organizations' members (see, e.g.,
26 Amended Complaint ¶¶ 207, 191), with the result that "[p]laintiff's [sic] properties and environment

1 are highly contaminated with toxic substances" (id. ¶ 211), the record is silent as to when Bi first
2 learned of the contamination of her property. Her realization in 1990 that she was suffering bodily
3 injury from contaminated well water is not dispositive because the affidavit indicates that the well
4 from which she obtained water was not on her property. (See Bi Aff. ¶ 6 (describing Bi's use of "the
5 handpump water well near where I live") (emphasis added).)

6 Defendants have not called to our attention any evidence that shows definitively the
7 date on which Bi knew or with reasonable diligence should have known that her property was
8 contaminated. They contend that the 1999 Greenpeace report, on which Bi relied as the basis for her
9 allegation that her property is contaminated, provided no information that was not available to Bi in
10 1990, and that Bi thus knew or should have known of this injury in 1990. We disagree. As discussed
11 in Part I.A. above, findings of no contamination emanating from the plant site were reported by the
12 Indian governmental organization NEERI in 1990 and 1997. (See First NEERI Report at unnumbered
13 Foreword page ("[i]nvestigations revealed that the land and water environment have not been
14 contaminated"); Second NEERI Report at unnumbered page 5 of Executive Summary
15 (reaffirming First NEERI Report's finding of no groundwater contamination in and around the plant
16 site).) In contrast, the Greenpeace Report issued in November 1999 stated that contamination was
17 found on land "both within and surrounding" the former UCIL plant site. (Greenpeace Report at 4
18 (emphasis added).) Given the contrary prior reports by NEERI, a factfinder could permissibly infer
19 that Bi in fact gained from the Greenpeace Report material information that she lacked earlier. Thus,
20 there are questions of fact to be resolved as to when Bi learned, or with reasonable diligence should
21 have learned, of the alleged damage to her property.

22 Finally, as discussed above, CPLR § 214-c provides a limitations period only with
23 respect to claims for damages. Thus, to the extent that the relief requested by Bi on her property
24 damage claims included injunctive relief in the form of remediation of her property or remediation of
25 the former UCIL plant site, those claims are not barred by § 214-c, although, as discussed in Part II.C.
26 below, the latter form of relief may be impracticable.

1 In considering Bi's property damage claims on remand, the district court may also
2 consider whether Bi is qualified to serve as a class representative to litigate such claims for damages
3 or injunctive relief on behalf of similarly situated individuals. We express no view as to the merits
4 of that question.

5 **B. The Organizations' Standing To Pursue Their Members' Claims**

6 The Bhopal organizations, which have not pleaded any injury to themselves, contend
7 that the district court should have allowed them to pursue the damages claims belonging to their
8 respective members. We see no error in the court's conclusion that the organizations lack standing
9 to pursue those claims.

10 In determining whether an association has standing to maintain a suit to redress its
11 members' injuries, rather than an injury to itself, we apply a three-pronged test. See, e.g., Hunt v.
12 Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422
13 U.S. 490, 511 (1975). Under this test, the association has standing if "(a) its members would
14 otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to
15 the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the
16 participation of individual members in the lawsuit." Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343; see also United Food &
17 Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 553 (1996) ("Brown
18 Group"); International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agriculture Implement Workers of
19 America v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 282 (1986) ("Brock"); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 511.

20 "[W]hether an association has standing to invoke the court's remedial powers on behalf
21 of its members depends in substantial measure on the nature of the relief sought." Id. at 515. We
22 know of no Supreme Court or federal court of appeals ruling that an association has standing to pursue
23 damages claims on behalf of its members. In Warth, the Supreme Court held that an organization
24 seeking to recover damages on behalf of its members lacked standing because "whatever injury may
25 have been suffered is peculiar to the individual member concerned, and both the fact and extent of

1 injury would require individualized proof." Id. at 515-16; see also id. at 515 ("[I]n the circumstances
2 of this case, the damages claims are not common to the entire membership, nor shared by all in equal
3 degree."). The Warth Court stated that

4 [i]f in a proper case the association seeks a declaration, injunction, or some
5 other form of prospective relief, it can reasonably be supposed that the remedy,
6 if granted, will inure to the benefit of those members of the association actually
7 injured. Indeed, in all cases in which we have expressly recognized standing
8 in associations to represent their members, the relief sought has been of this
9 kind.

10 Id. at 515. This does not mean, however, that an association automatically satisfies the third prong
11 of the Hunt test simply by requesting equitable relief rather than damages. The organization lacks
12 standing to assert claims of injunctive relief on behalf of its members where "the fact and extent" of
13 the injury that gives rise to the claims for injunctive relief "would require individualized proof," Warth
14 v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 515-16, or where "the relief requested [would] require[] the participation of
15 individual members in the lawsuit," Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343.

16 In contrast, where the organization seeks a purely legal ruling without requesting that
17 the federal court award individualized relief to its members, the Hunt test may be satisfied. In Brock,
18 the Supreme Court ruled that a union had standing to challenge a "policy directive" of the United
19 States Department of Labor that "allegedly resulted in the denial of [trade readjustment allowance]
20 benefits to thousands of the Union's members." 477 U.S. at 281. In so ruling, however, the Court
21 noted that the suit did not directly seek recovery of the individual union members' denied benefits, see
22 id. at 284, and that "the unique facts of each [union] member's claim" for "the benefits allegedly due
23 him" would be adjudicated by state authorities, id. at 288. The Brock Court concluded that the union
24 had standing because it "raise[d] a pure question of law: whether the Secretary properly interpreted
25 the Trade Act's . . . eligibility provisions," id. at 287; the union thus "c[ould] litigate th[e] case without
26 the participation of those individual claimants," id. at 288. See also Hunt, 432 U.S. at 344
27 (organization had standing where "neither the interstate commerce claim nor the request for
28 declaratory and injunctive relief require[d] individualized proof and both [we]re thus properly resolved
29 in a group context").

1 Although the Bhopal organizations argue that they have the ability to pursue their
2 members' damages claims without the participation of the members themselves, we disagree. The
3 claims are that individuals have suffered bodily harm and damage to real property they own.
4 Necessarily, each of those individuals would have to be involved in the proof of his or her claims. The
5 district court did not err in concluding that the organizations lack standing to pursue these claims.

6 The Bhopal organizations also urge this Court to disregard the third Hunt requirement
7 for associational standing because they seek to pursue their members' claims as class representatives
8 in a class action pursuant to Rule 23. Although Hunt's third prong represents a prudential rather than
9 a constitutional requirement for standing, see Brown Group, 517 U.S. at 557, we see no reason to relax
10 it where, in order for the organizations to succeed in the lawsuit, there must be participation by the
11 members themselves. Associational standing carves only a narrow exception from the ordinary rule
12 that a litigant "must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the
13 legal rights or interests of third parties," Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
14 Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at
15 499). If the involvement of individual members of an association is necessary, either because the
16 substantive nature of the claim or the form of the relief sought requires their participation, we see no
17 sound reason to allow the organization standing to press their claims, even where it seeks to do so as
18 a putative class representative. In such circumstances, the standing of an association is limited to
19 bringing claims arising out of injuries that the organization, not simply its members, suffered.

20 For similar reasons, we conclude that the organizations' claims seeking relief for their
21 members in the form of reimbursement for the costs of medical monitoring of their physical condition
22 were dismissable for lack of associational standing. In Rent Stabilization Ass'n v. Dinkins, 5 F.3d
23 591, 596 (2d Cir. 1993), for example, we upheld a ruling that an association of landlords lacked
24 standing to bring an "as-applied" Takings Clause challenge to a rent-control law on behalf of its
25 members because the Court "would have to engage in an ad hoc factual inquiry for each landlord who
26 alleges that he has suffered a taking," including "determin[ing] the landlord's particular return based

1 on a host of individualized financial data, and . . . investigat[ing] the reasons for any failure to obtain
2 an adequate return." Id. (emphasis in original). Proof of claims for medical monitoring under New
3 York law would similarly require individualized inquiries. In Abusio v. Consolidated Edison Co. of
4 New York, Inc., 238 A.D.2d 454, 656 N.Y.S.2d 371 (2d Dep't 1997) (mem.), the court held that in
5 order to prevail on such a claim, "a plaintiff must establish both that he or she was in fact exposed to
6 the disease-causing agent and that there is a 'rational basis' for his or her fear of contracting the
7 disease," id. at 454, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 372, which the court construed to mean the "clinically
8 demonstrable presence" of a carcinogen in the plaintiff's body or some indication of a disease induced
9 by the carcinogen, id. at 455, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 372. We cannot envision a medical monitoring program
10 that would not require the participation of the organizations' individual members.

11 We take a similar view of the Bhopal organizations' request for remediation of their
12 members' private properties. Participation by individual property owners would be needed to permit
13 identification of which properties were contaminated. As to each property so identified, individual
14 assessments would be required as to the nature, breadth, and severity of the contamination, and
15 consideration would have to be given to, inter alia, each owner's actual and intended use or uses of his
16 or her land, in order to permit a determination as to which specific remediation methods would be
17 appropriate for the clean-up of that property. We conclude that, because the individual participation
18 of the organizations' members would be necessary before an injunction ordering remediation of their
19 private properties could be issued, the Bhopal organizations lack standing to pursue this form of relief
20 on behalf of their members.

21 In sum, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the claims asserted by the
22 organizations, given our conclusions that determinations as to the injuries suffered by individual
23 members and the needs of each such individual for medical monitoring and/or for remediation of his
24 or her own property cannot be made without the participation of the members. We therefore need not
25 consider the district court's conclusion that medical monitoring would be impracticable.

1 C. Dismissal of the Claim for Remediation of the Plant Site

2 Finally, we reject plaintiffs' contention that the district court erred in dismissing their
3 claims for remediation of the former UCIL plant site. "In shaping equity decrees, the trial court is
4 vested with broad discretionary power; appellate review is correspondingly narrow." Lemon v.
5 Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200 (1973). A district court's grant or denial of equitable relief is reviewed
6 for abuse of discretion, which may consist of, inter alia, a ruling based on an erroneous view of the
7 law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. See generally Zervos v. Verizon New York,
8 Inc., 252 F.3d 163, 169-71 & n.5 (2d Cir. 2001).

9 "The practicability of drafting and enforcing an order or judgment for an injunction is
10 one of the factors to be considered in determining the appropriateness of injunction against tort."

11 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 943 (1979) ("Restatement"). The federal court sitting as a

12 court of equity having personal jurisdiction over a party has power to enjoin
13 him from committing acts elsewhere. But this power should be exercised with
14 great reluctance when it will be difficult to secure compliance with any
15 resulting decree or when the exercise of such power is fraught with
16 possibilities of discord and conflict with the authorities of another country.

17 Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 647 (2d Cir. 1956) (footnote omitted). "If
18 drafting and enforcing are found to be impracticable, the injunction should not be granted."
19 Restatement comment a; see also Bethlehem Engineering Export Co. v. Christie, 105 F.2d 933, 935
20 (2d Cir. 1939) (denying injunctive relief as impracticable). There may be circumstances in which it
21 is appropriate for a court to grant injunctive relief with respect to the remediation of an environmental
22 problem in a foreign country, as, for example, where the other nation has attempted to join the federal
23 lawsuit, see, e.g., Jota v. Texaco Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 155, 158 (2d Cir. 1998), and "much of the relief
24 sought could be fully provided by [the defendant] without any participation by [the other nation]," id.
25 at 162. But injunctive relief may properly be refused when it would interfere with the other nation's
26 sovereignty. See generally Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d at 647; 11A C. Wright,
27 A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2942, at 52-53 (2d ed. 1995).

28 In the present case, the plant-site remediation sought by plaintiffs would necessarily

1 require the cooperation of the State of Madhya Pradesh, for it is the current owner and possessor of
2 the land. And although the district court inferred that Madhya Pradesh would cooperate in a
3 remediation effort, see Bano II, 2003 WL 1344884 at *8, Madhya Pradesh has neither been made a
4 party to this lawsuit nor sought to intervene, and the record contains no communication from Madhya
5 Pradesh or the Indian government indicating its receptivity to an order of a United States court
6 compelling work on the property. Thus, Union Carbide's ability to comply with an injunction
7 requiring remediation of the former UCIL plant site would be dependent on permission from an entity
8 that is not a party to this lawsuit and that, therefore, cannot be subject to the district court's injunction.
9 See, e.g., Alemite Manufacturing Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 832 (2d Cir. 1930) ("[N]o court can
10 make a decree which will bind any one but a party."). Given that circumstance, along with the
11 concerns expressed by the district court as to the difficulty that a United States court would have in
12 controlling and overseeing the progress of remediation in India, we see no abuse of discretion in the
13 court's conclusion that an injunction for remediation of the plant site would be impracticable.
14 However, given that the matter is to be remanded for further proceedings with respect to Bi's claims
15 of damage to her property, we believe the district court should be free to revisit its dismissal of the
16 claim for plant-site remediation in the event that the Indian government or the State of Madhya
17 Pradesh seeks to intervene in the action or otherwise urges the court to order such relief.

18 CONCLUSION

19 We have considered all of plaintiffs' contentions on this appeal and, except to the extent
20 indicated above, have found them to be without merit. The judgment of the district court is affirmed
21 except to the extent that it dismissed Bi's claims for property damage, and the matter is remanded for
22 further proceedings with respect to those claims, including consideration of whether Bi may prosecute
23 those claims in a class action. The court is also free, consistent with this opinion, to reconsider, prior
24 to the entry of a final judgment, plaintiffs' request for relief in the form of remediation of the former

1 UCIL plant site.

2 No costs.